



## A CCA2-Secure Incomparable Public Key Encryption Scheme

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### ABSTRACT

In 2003, Waters, Felten and Sahai introduced a novel cryptographic primitive called Incomparable Public Key cryptosystem to protect anonymity of message receivers in an untrusted network. In this setting, a receiver is allowed to create many anonymous identities for himself without divulging the fact that all these identities refer to the same receiver. Recently, Lee and Lim improved the solution of Waters et al. with a more efficient decryption process. Both of these schemes are based on the ElGamal encryption scheme and are CCA1-secure in the sense of data privacy and IK-CPA-secure in the sense of key privacy. In this paper, we employ the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme to propose the first example of an incomparable public key encryption scheme which is CCA2-secure in data privacy and IK-CCA-secure in key privacy. Therefore, our scheme outperforms existing incomparable public key schemes in security properties.

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## 1 Introduction

It is a well known fact that in the context of public key encryption, public keys are usually closely related to the identity of recipients. Therefore, a wide range of research in public key cryptography is done to devise cryptographic schemes which guarantee the anonymity of recipients against eavesdroppers as well as message senders [1–16]. One approach to achieve anonymity against eavesdroppers is using public key encryption schemes with *key privacy* property introduced in 2001 by Bellare et al. [17]. This property has important applications in building (receiver) anonymous channels, or privacy-enhanced authentication/signature schemes. Key privacy ensures that for a specific adversary, it is impossible to determine which of the keys has been used to encrypt a given ciphertext. Hence,

key privacy provides some anonymity for receiver from the point of view of the adversary. However, this is not enough to guarantee recipient's anonymity against senders. In other words, if senders share the same public key to encrypt messages to be sent for an anonymous receiver, they can obtain some information to compromise the anonymity of that public key's owner. As an example, Bellare et al. showed that the basic ElGamal encryption achieves key privacy but if two recipients in a network use different cyclic groups then, anonymity can be compromised either due to the contents of messages or public keys themselves.

Another approach to guarantee the anonymity of recipients against eavesdroppers as well as traffic analysis is re-encryption of all the messages. In 2004, Golle et al. exploited the homomorphic property of ElGamal to propose a universal re-encryption which is a modification of the basic ElGamal encryption scheme [4]. The authors, suggested several applications of the universal re-encryption scheme including mix-nets and anonymizing bulletin board systems [3, 4]. The main

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idea of re-encryption is using a public key encryption scheme with key privacy property such that without any knowledge of the corresponding public key, a ciphertext  $C$  can be changed into another ciphertext  $C_1$  and both of these ciphertexts can be decrypted to the same plaintext with the same secret key.

To achieve receiver's anonymity against senders, in 2003, Waters et al. proposed an '*incomparable*' public key scheme [15]. In this approach, a receiver can create as many anonymous identities (public keys) as desired and give them to different senders. It is even possible to give multiple anonymous identities to the same sender if the receiver is carrying on multiple independent conversations with that sender. This will prevent compromising receiver's anonymity against coalition of senders as well. In this approach, the recipient is allowed to issue several public keys, all related to his unique secret key. The main idea here is using a public key encryption scheme with the property of key privacy in such a way that it is computationally impossible to distinguish that two given public keys are related to the same recipient. To do so, Waters et al. introduced the notions of equivalent public keys, key incomparability and incomparable public key encryption scheme. Two public keys which correspond to the same secret key are called equivalent. A public key encryption has key incomparability if it is not possible to distinguish two equivalent public keys from two non-equivalent public keys. Finally a public key encryption scheme which has key incomparability is called incomparable public key encryption scheme.

We have grounds to prefer incomparable public key scheme over universal re-encryption scheme. In the universal re-encryption scheme, the senders know the (unique) public key of the intended recipient. Hence, a coalition of senders can be a threat to the anonymity of the recipient. Moreover, we need some trusted centers to change ciphertexts which leads to lose self-reliance in security. However, if each recipient is able to create a large number of anonymous identities such that no (feasible) entity is able to determine that those anonymous identities correspond to the same receiver, then all users in the system can be regarded as potential recipients of every ciphertext. This ability would further prevent them from aggregating the information they have about the receiver which is important in an environment where senders can find a little information about each receiver.

In Waters et al.'s scheme, every recipient in a multicast group must first completely decrypt a message in order to find out if it belongs to him or not. In 2011, Lee and Lim proposed a modification of Waters et al.'s scheme in which the number of computations that the recipient has to carry out is reduced while

the security level remains unchanged. Here, the recipient can first determine whether a ciphertext is directed to him, and only if the direction is correct, he decrypts it [11]. Both Waters et al.'s and Lee and Lim's schemes are based on homomorphic encryption and therefore, their schemes can not achieve security level better than nonadaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (*CCA1*) in the sense of data privacy. On the other hand, both of these schemes are based on ElGamal encryption scheme which Bellare et al. [17] have shown to achieve indistinguishability of keys under chosen plaintext attacks (*IK - CPA* security in the sense of key privacy). Therefore, both of these scheme has *IK - CPA* security (see Lemma 1 of Section 6).

In this paper, we propose the first example of an incomparable public key encryption scheme which is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (*CCA2* secure) in data privacy and achieves indistinguishability of keys under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (*IK - CCA*) in key privacy. Our scheme is based on Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [18, 19] and its decryption procedure is done in two steps as in [11]. Therefore, the proposed scheme outperforms existing incomparable public key encryption schemes either in terms of computation or security.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide notations, assumptions and definitions required in the rest of the paper. In Section 3, we review related work including existing incomparable public key encryption schemes together with a description of Cramer Shoup scheme. A general construction for an *HPKE* with key incomparability is given in Section 4. Section 5 presents our incomparable public key encryption scheme and Section 6 provides an analysis of the scheme. Comparison with the existing literature is done in Section 7 and finally conclusions are provided in Section 8.

## 2 Preliminaries

In this section, we briefly provide the notations, definitions and assumptions used throughout the paper.

### 2.1 Notations

In Table 1, we use  $\lambda, pk, sk, m$  and  $c$  to denote the security parameter, the public key, the secret key, the plaintext and the ciphertext in an encryption scheme, respectively. By  $(c_1, c_2, \dots) \leftarrow A(b_1, b_2, \dots)$  we mean a deterministic algorithm  $A$  which takes  $b_1, b_2, \dots$  as input and produces  $c_1, c_2, \dots$  as output. In the case of a probabilistic algorithm we use the notation  $\leftarrow^R$ .

Note that to encrypt a message  $m$  in an *HPKE*, we use its *PKE* to encrypt a random key  $K$  and then



**Table 1.** Table of notations.

Scheme	Abbreviation	Algorithms
Public Key Encryption Scheme	$PKE$	$(pk, sk) \leftarrow KEYGEN(\lambda)$ $c \leftarrow^R ENC(m, pk)$ $m \leftarrow DEC(c, sk)$
Symmetric Key Encryption Scheme	$SKE$	$s \leftarrow KEYGEN(\lambda)$ $c \leftarrow^R ENC(m, s)$ $m \leftarrow DEC(c, s)$
Hybrid Public Key Encryption Scheme From $PKE, SKE$	$HPKE$	$(pk, sk) \leftarrow KEYGEN(\lambda)$ $(c_1, c_2) \leftarrow^R ENC(m, pk) = (ENC_{PKE}(K, pk), ENC_{SKE}(m, K))$ $m \leftarrow DEC((c_1, c_2), sk) = DEC_{SKE}(c_2, DEC_{PKE}(c_1, pk))$

encrypt  $m$  using  $SKE$  with the key  $K$ . A  $PKE$  which is used in the structure of a  $HPKE$  is called **key encapsulation mechanism** ( $KEM$ ) of that  $HPKE$ .

## 2.2 Privacy notions

In this paper, the following notions of privacy are considered.

### 2.2.1 Notions of data privacy

Data privacy of an encryption scheme has been well documented in the literature [8, 20]. We consider three types of adversarial attacks: chosen plaintext attacks ( $CPA$ ), nonadaptive chosen ciphertext attacks ( $CCA1$ ) and adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks ( $CCA2$ ). In this section, we provide a brief description of these notions.

Consider the following experiment for any public key encryption scheme  $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$ :

**The  $CPA$  indistinguishability experiment**  $EXP_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{CPA}(\lambda)$ :

- (1) A key pair, public key  $pk$  and secret key  $sk$  is generated by running  $Gen(1^\lambda)$ .
- (2) The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is given input  $1^\lambda$  and access to  $Enc_{PKE}(-, pk)$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a pair of messages  $m_0, m_1$ .
- (3) A random bit  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$  is chosen, and then a ciphertext  $c \leftarrow Enc_{pk}(m_b)$  is computed and given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- (4) The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  continues to have access to  $Enc_{PKE}(-, pk)$ , and outputs a bit  $b'$ .
- (5) The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if  $b' = b$ , and 0 otherwise. (In case  $EXP_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{CPA}(\lambda) = 1$ , we say that  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeded.)

**Definition 1. ( $CPA$  security)** A public key en-

ryption scheme  $\Pi = (Gen, Enc, Dec)$  has indistinguishable encryptions under a chosen-plaintext attack (or is  $CPA$ -secure) if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries  $\mathcal{A}$  there exists a negligible function  $negl$  such that

$$Pr[EXP_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{CPA}(\lambda) = 1] < 1/2 + negl(n),$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins used by  $\mathcal{A}$ , as well as the random coins used in the experiment.

If in step 2 of the above experiment, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  has access to the decryption oracle  $DEC_{sk}$ , we come up with the experiment  $EXP_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{CCA1}(\lambda)$  and can define  $CCA1$  security in the same manner.  $CCA2$  security is achieved based on  $EXP_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{CCA2}(\lambda)$  in which the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  has oracle access to  $DEC_{sk}$  in steps 2 and 4.

The relation between these security notions are as follows:

$$CPA \leq CCA1 \leq CCA2$$

In other words, if a scheme is  $CCA2$  secure, then it is also  $CCA1$  secure and if a scheme is  $CCA1$  secure, then it is also  $CPA$  secure.

### 2.2.2 Notions of key privacy

The notion of key privacy in the public key encryption was introduced by Bellare et al.[17]. Key privacy provides anonymity of public keys. In the formalization of key privacy in the public key encryption setting, the adversary has access to a pair of public keys  $pk_0, pk_1$  and a ciphertext  $c$  which is the encryption of an arbitrary message under one of these public keys. The possession of  $c$  should not give the adversary any advantage in determining which one of the keys has been used to create  $c$ .



Let  $\Pi$  be a  $PKE$  scheme and  $\mathcal{A}_{CPA}$  be the adversary who is given two public keys. Consider the key privacy experiment  $EXP_{\mathcal{A}_{CPA}, \Pi}^{IK-CPA}(\lambda)$ , played between  $\mathcal{A}_{CPA}$  and a challenger, as follow:

- Two key pairs  $(pk_0, sk_0), (pk_1, sk_1)$  are generated by running  $KEYGEN(\lambda)$ .
- The adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{CPA}$  is given input  $\lambda, pk_0$  and  $pk_1$ . It outputs a message  $m$ .
- The challenger chooses a random bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ , computes the ciphertext  $c = ENC_{PKE}(m, pk_b)$  and gives  $c$  to  $\mathcal{A}_{CPA}$ .
- The adversary tries to guess which public key was used to encrypt  $m$  and he outputs a bit  $b'$ . The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if  $b' = b$ , and 0 otherwise.

We define the advantage of the adversary via

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}_{CPA}, \Pi}^{IK-CPA}(\lambda) = |Pr[EXP_{\mathcal{A}_{CPA}, \Pi}^{IK-CPA}(\lambda) = 1] - Pr[EXP_{\mathcal{A}_{CPA}, \Pi}^{IK-CPA}(\lambda) = 0]|.$$

**Definition 2. (IK – CPA security)** The scheme  $\Pi$  has indistinguishability of keys under chosen-plaintext attacks (or is  $IK - CPA$  secure) if the function  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}_{CPA}, \Pi}^{IK-CPA}(\lambda)$  is negligible for polynomial time adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{CPA}$  whose time complexity is polynomial in  $\lambda$ .

Consider the experiment  $EXP_{\mathcal{A}_{CCA}, \Pi}^{IK-CCA}(\lambda)$  the same as  $EXP_{\mathcal{A}_{CPA}, \Pi}^{IK-CPA}(\lambda)$  except that in this case, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{CCA}$  has access to decryption oracles  $DEC_{SK_0}$  and  $DEC_{SK_1}$  as well. It is mandated that  $\mathcal{A}_{CCA}$  never queries  $DEC_{sk_0}$  or  $DEC_{sk_1}$  on the challenge ciphertext  $c$ .

**Definition 3. (IK – CCA security)** The scheme  $\Pi$  has indistinguishability of keys under chosen-ciphertext attacks (or is  $IK - CCA$  secure) if the function  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}_{CCA}, \Pi}^{IK-CCA}(\lambda)$  is negligible for any polynomial time adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{CCA}$  whose time complexity is polynomial in  $\lambda$ .

It is therefore easy to see that we have

$$IK - CPA \leq IK - CCA.$$

In other words, if a scheme is  $IK - CCA$  secure, then it is also  $IK - CPA$  secure.

### 2.3 Hardness Assumptions

Security of our proposed scheme is based on the following assumptions.

**Target Collision Resistant (TCR) Hash Function assumption:** A family of hash functions is said to be collision resistant if upon drawing a function  $H$  at random from the family  $\mathcal{H}$ , it is infeasible for an

adversary to find two different inputs  $x$  and  $y$  such that  $H(x) = H(y)$ .

A weaker notion is that of a *target collision resistant* family of hash functions. In this case, it should be infeasible for an adversary to choose an input  $x$ , draw a random hash function  $H$ , and then find a different input  $y$  such that  $H(x) = H(y)$ . Such hash function families are also called "universal one-way hash functions".

**Decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption** Consider a (multiplicative) cyclic group  $G$  of order  $q$  and generator  $g$ . The  $DDH$  assumption states that, given  $g^a$  and  $g^b$  for uniformly and independently chosen  $a, b \in Z_q$ , the value  $g^{ab}$  "looks like" a random element in  $G$ . This intuitive notion is formally stated by saying that the following two probability distributions are computationally indistinguishable (in the security parameter  $n = \log(q)$ ).

- $T_1 = (g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab})$ , where  $a$  and  $b$  are randomly and independently chosen from  $Z_q$  ( $T_1$  is also known as  $DH$ -quadruple).
- $T_2 = (g, g^a, g^b, c)$ , where  $a$  and  $b$  are randomly and independently chosen from  $Z_q$  and  $c$  is a random element in  $G$ .

## 3 Related Work

In this section, we first review existing incomparable public key encryption schemes, i.e. Waters et al.'s [15] and Lee and Lim's [11] schemes. We then provide details of the Cramer-Shoup's  $PKE$  which we later use for presenting our proposed incomparable public key encryption scheme.

### 3.1 Waters et al's Public Key Encryption Scheme

Waters et al.  $PKE$  scheme is based on ELGamal  $PKE$  and consists of four algorithms (SETUP, KEYGEN, ENC, DEC) as follows ([15]).

**SETUP:** On input security parameter  $\lambda$ , the setup algorithm SETUP generates a secure safe prime  $p$ , where  $p = 2q + 1$  for a prime number  $q$ , sets a cryptographically secure hash function  $H$ , sets a secure symmetric encryption scheme  $E$ , and outputs the system parameter  $I = (p, q, H, E)$ .

**KEYGEN:**

- On input system parameter  $I$ , generates  $a$  at random in  $Z_q^*$ , and sets the private key  $sk = a$ .
- On input private key  $sk$ , generates a generator  $g \in Z_p^*$  of the order  $q$  at random, and sets a public key  $pk = (g, g^a)$ .

To obtain another equivalent public key for  $sk$ , the



recipient computes another generator  $h = g^x$  for randomly chosen  $1 < x < q$ , issues the public key  $(h, h^a)$ .

**ENC:** On input public key  $pk = (g, g^a)$  and a message  $m$ , the encryption algorithm  $E$  chooses  $r \in Z_q^*$  at random and outputs the ciphertext

$$C = ENC_{PKE}(m, pk) \\ = (g^r, g^{ar} \cdot K, H(r), E_{SKE}((r, (g, g^a), m), K)).$$

**DEC:** On input private key  $sk$  and a ciphertext  $(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4)$ , the decryption algorithm DEC

- \* Computes  $K = c_3/g^a$ .
- \* Computes  $D_{SKE}(c_4, K) = (r', pk', m)$ .
- \* Checks the equalities  $H(r') = c_4$ ,  $g^{r'} = c_1 \bmod p$  and the validity of the public key  $pk'$ .
- \* Outputs  $m$  as the plaintext only if all the checks are correct.

### 3.2 Lee and Lim's Public Key Encryption Scheme

Lee and Lim's *PKE* scheme consists of four algorithms (SETUP, KEYGEN, ENC, DEC) as follows ([11]).

**SETUP:** On input security parameter  $\lambda$ , the setup algorithm SETUP generates a secure safe prime  $p$ , where  $p = 2q + 1$  for a prime number  $q$ , sets a cryptographically secure hash function  $H$ , sets a secure symmetric encryption scheme  $E$ , and outputs the system parameter  $I = (p, q, H, E)$ .

**KEYGEN:**

- On input system parameter  $I$ , generates  $a, b$  at random in  $Z_q^*$ , and sets the private key  $sk = (a, b)$ .
- On input private key  $sk$ , generates a generator  $g \in Z_p^*$  of the order  $q$  at random, and sets a public key  $pk = (g, g^a, g^b)$ .

To obtain another equivalent public key for  $sk$ , the recipient computes another generator  $h = g^x$  for randomly chosen  $1 < x < q$ , issues the public key  $(h, h^a)$ .

**ENC:** On input public key  $pk = (g, g^a)$  and a message  $m$ , the encryption algorithm  $E$  chooses  $r \in Z_q^*$  at random and outputs the ciphertext

$$C = ENC_{PKE}(m, pk) \\ = (g^r, g^{ar}, g^{br} \cdot K, H(r), E_K(r, (g, g^a), m)).$$

**DEC:** On input private key  $sk$  and a ciphertext  $(c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, c_5)$ , the decryption algorithm DEC, first checks the equality  $c_1^a - c_2 = 0 \bmod p$ , only if the equality holds, proceeds as follows:

- \* Computes  $K = c_3/g^a$ .
- \* Computes  $D_{SKE}(c_5, K) = (r', pk', m)$ .
- \* Checks the equalities  $H(r') = c_4$ ,  $g^{r'} = c_1 \bmod p$  and  $g^{ar'} = c_2 \bmod p$  and the validity of the public key  $pk'$ .

- \* Outputs  $m$  as the plaintext only if all the checks are correct.

### 3.3 Cramer-Shoup's Public Key Encryption Scheme

Assume that  $G$  is a group with a subgroup  $\hat{G}$  of prime order  $q$  such that the *DDH* problem is hard in  $\hat{G}$ . Also assume that  $H$  is a *TCR* hash function from  $G^3$  to  $Z_q$ . The Cramer-Shoup *PKE*'s algorithms are as follows ([18, 19]).

**KEYGEN:** The key generation algorithm on input of the security parameter  $\lambda$ , chooses random elements  $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z \in Z_q$  and  $g_1, g_2 \in \hat{G}$  such that  $g_2 = g_1^w$  for some  $w \in Z_q$ . It computes  $c = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}$ ,  $d = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}$ ,  $h = g_1^z$  and sets  $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$  and  $pk = (g_1, g_2, c, d, h)$ .

**ENC:** To encrypt a message  $m \in G$ , the encryption algorithm chooses  $r \in Z_q$  at random. It computes  $u_1 = g_1^r$ ,  $u_2 = g_2^r$ ,  $e = mh^r$ ,  $\alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e)$  and  $v = c^r d^{r\alpha}$ . The ciphertext is  $(u_1, u_2, e, v)$ .

**DEC:** To decrypt a ciphertext  $(u_1, u_2, e, v)$ , the decryption algorithm computes  $\alpha = H(u_1, u_2, e)$ , and tests if  $u_1^{x_1 + \alpha y_1} u_2^{x_2 + \alpha y_2} = v$ . If this condition does not hold, the decryption algorithm outputs "reject"; otherwise, it outputs  $m = \frac{e}{u_1^z}$ .

## 4 General Construction of *HPKE* with Key Incomparability

The aim of this section is to show that constructing an *HPKE* with key incomparability and desired security properties, reduces to choosing a *KEM* with desired security properties and proving that this *KEM* has key incomparability property. Note that the key component of such an *HPKE* is its *KEM*. This is because first, public keys in the *HPKE* are generated by the key generation algorithm in its *KEM*. So, if there is a feasible secure approach for the *KEM* to create as many public keys as desired related to a secret key, then the approach can be used for the *HPKE*, too. Second, if a proper *SKE* is used together with the *KEM* to build the *HPKE*, then the resulting *HPKE* inherits security properties (key privacy and data privacy) of the *KEM* as well. We state the following two lemmas to prove this. In subsequent sections, we prove that under certain hardness assumptions, the Cramer-Shoup *PKE* achieves key incomparability and can be used as a *KEM* with this general construction.

**Lemma 1.** *If a *PKE* achieves some key privacy security, then any *HPKE* that uses this *PKE* as its *KEM*, achieves the same key privacy security.*

*Proof.* Let  $\Pi$  be the *HPKE* that uses  $\Pi', \Pi''$  as its *KEM* and *SKE*, respectively. We show that if there



exists a polynomial time adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  who can compromise key privacy of  $\Pi$  with a non-negligible advantage, then we can construct a polynomial time distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  for compromising key privacy of  $\Pi'$  as well. Suppose that the distinguisher is given two public keys  $pk_0, pk_1$ , a message  $m$  and a ciphertext  $c_b$ . Its goal is to determine whether  $c_b$  is the encryption of  $m$  under the public key  $pk_0$  or  $pk_1$  in the setting  $\Pi'$ .  $\mathcal{D}$  emulates the key privacy experiment for  $\mathcal{A}$  in the manner described below and observes outputs of  $\mathcal{D}$ . If  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 0 then  $\mathcal{D}$  guesses that  $c_b$  must be encryption of  $m$  under the public key  $pk_0$ , while if  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 1 then  $\mathcal{D}$  guesses that  $c_b$  is the encryption of  $m$  under the public key  $pk_1$ . In detail:

Distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$ :  $\mathcal{D}$  is given as input a quadruple  $(m, pk_0, pk_1, c_b)$ .

- The distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  runs  $KEYGEN(\lambda)$  and gives  $pk_0, pk_1$  to  $\mathcal{A}$  in the setting  $\Pi$ .
- $\mathcal{A}$  generates a message  $m'$  and gives it to  $\mathcal{D}$ .
- $\mathcal{D}$  computes  $c' = ENC_{SKE}(m', m)$  in setting  $\Pi'$  ( $\mathcal{D}$  uses  $m$  as a key) and gives  $c = (c_b, c')$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\mathcal{A}$  uses his ability to guess whether  $c$  is the encryption of  $m'$  under the public key  $pk_0$  or  $pk_1$  in the setting  $\Pi$  and outputs a bit  $b'$ .
- If  $b' = 0$ ,  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs " $c_b$  is the encryption of  $m$  under the public key  $pk_0$ ". Otherwise,  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs " $c_b$  is the encryption of  $m$  under the public key  $pk_1$ ".

Note that what  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs is in the setting  $\Pi'$ . From the above it is obvious that for  $i = 0, 1$  we have:  $c_b = Enc_{PKE}(m, pk_i)$  in setting  $\Pi'$  if and only if  $c = ENC(m', pk_i)$  in setting  $\Pi$ .

Since the output of  $\mathcal{D}$  is based on the output of  $\mathcal{A}$  and  $\mathcal{D}$  makes a true guess if and only if  $\mathcal{A}$  makes a true guess, then the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  in the key privacy experiment for the setting  $\Pi$  is equal to the advantage of  $\mathcal{D}$  in the key privacy experiment for the setting  $\Pi'$ . Hence, if  $\Pi'$  (as a  $KEM$ ) achieves  $IK - CCA$  (or  $IK - CPA$ ) key privacy security level then  $\Pi$  (as a  $HPKE$  based on  $\Pi'$ ) preserves  $IK - CCA$  (or  $IK - CPA$ ) as well.  $\square$

Analogous to Lemma 1, we can relate the data privacy properties of a  $HPKE$  to the key privacy of its  $KEM$ .

**Lemma 2.** *If  $KEM$  and  $SKE$  are CCA2 secure, then so is  $HPKE$ . (Theorem 5 [19])*

## 5 Our Proposed Scheme

We make novel use of the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem and its properties to realize an incomparable public key encryption scheme. In our scheme, every recipient in the multicast group can identify the ciphertext di-

rected to him in the multicast address more efficiently. The details of each algorithm of our  $PKE$  scheme are as follows:

**SETUP:** On input of the security parameter  $\lambda$ , the setup algorithm:

- Generates a group  $G$  with a subgroup  $\hat{G}$  of prime order  $q$  such that the  $DDH$  problem is hard in  $\hat{G}$ . For example  $\hat{G}$  could be the subgroup of quadratic residues in  $Z_p^*$  for the prime number  $p$ . Here, we have  $p = 2q + 1$  where  $q$  is also prime [21].
- Sets a family of  $TCR$  hash functions and chooses a random function  $H$  of this family.
- Sets a semantically secure symmetric encryption scheme  $\mathcal{E} = \{E, D\}$ .
- Outputs the system parameters  $I = (p, G, H, \mathcal{E})$ .

These parameters are common to all recipients.

**KEYGEN:** The key generation algorithm consists of two phases defined as follows.

**phase 1:** On input of the system parameters  $I$ , the algorithm chooses  $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z \in Z_q^*$  at random, and sets the secret key  $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$ .

**phase 2:** On input of the secret key  $sk$ , the algorithm generates random elements  $g_1$  of order  $q$  and for some  $w \in Z_q$ , and sets a public key  $pk = (g_1, g_2, c, d, h)$  such that  $c = g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}$ ,  $d = g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}$ ,  $h = g_1^z$ . To obtain another equivalent public key for  $sk$ , the recipient chooses  $g'_1 \in G$  of order  $q$  and  $g'_2 = g_1^{w'}$  for some  $w' \in Z_q$  different from  $(g_1, g_2)$  and sets  $pk' = (g'_1, g'_2, c', d', h')$  where  $c' = (g'_1)^{x_1} (g'_2)^{x_2}$ ,  $d' = (g'_1)^{y_1} (g'_2)^{y_2}$ ,  $h' = (g'_1)^z$ .

The output is the multiple key  $(sk, pk, pk', \dots)$ . Every recipient runs this algorithm to generate his secret key and some public keys (as many as needed).

**ENC:** On input of the public key  $pk = (g_1, g_2, c, d, h)$  and a message  $m$ , the encryption algorithm chooses  $r \in Z_q$  and  $K \in G$  at random and outputs the ciphertext

$$C = (g_1^r, g_2^r, h^r K, c^r d^{r\alpha}, E_{SKE}((pk, r, m), K))$$

where  $\alpha = H(g_1^r, g_2^r, h^r K)$ .

**DEC:** On input of the secret key  $sk$  and a ciphertext  $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3, c_4, c_5)$  the decryption algorithm  $DEC$  proceeds as follow:

**step 1** Computes  $\alpha = H(c_1, c_2, c_3)$ . Then checks if  $c_1^{x_1+y_1\alpha} c_2^{x_2+y_2\alpha} = c_4$  or not. If the equality does not hold, unhands the message, otherwise continues to the next step.

**step 2**

- Computes  $K = \frac{c_3}{c_1}$ .
- Computes  $D_{SKE}(c_5, K) = (pk, r, m)$  where  $D$  is the decryption algorithm of  $\mathcal{E}$ .

All of the members in a multicast group share the same system parameters generated by the algo-



rithm **SETUP**. The recipient with the secret key  $(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$  generates  $g_1, g_2 \in G$  at random and stores the public key  $(g_1, g_2, g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, g_1^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, g_1^z)$  in his public key table to record it as being valid. To construct another public key from the secret key  $(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$ , the recipient generates another pair  $s_1, s_2 \in \widehat{G}$ , issues the public key  $(s_1, s_2, s_1^{x_1} s_2^{x_2}, s_1^{y_1} s_2^{y_2}, s_1^z)$  with another identity and adds this public key in his public key table. When a recipient see a ciphertext in the address of the multicast group, he checks the first step of **DEC** to determine if the message belongs to him or not. If the equality doesn't hold, he rejects the message otherwise he saves that message to decrypt it in proper time.

## 6 Analysis of Our Scheme

In this section, we show that our proposed scheme achieves key incomparability, *CCA2*-security in data privacy and *IK* – *CCA*-security in key privacy. The security of our scheme is based on the hardness of the *DDH* problem.

### 6.1 Key Incomparability

**Theorem 1.** *If the *DDH* assumption holds in  $\widehat{G}$ , then our proposed scheme  $\Pi$  achieves key-incomparability.*

*Proof.* We show that if there exists a polynomial time adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  who can distinguish whether two given public keys are related to the same secret key or not, then this adversary can be used to solve an instance of the *DDH* problem, thus contradicting the assumption of the theorem.

Consider the following experiment which is designed based on definitions in [11, 15].

**public key incomparability experiment**  $PubK_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}(\lambda)$

- The challenger runs *SETUP*( $\lambda$ ) and generates two secret keys  $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$  and  $sk' = (x'_1, x'_2, y'_1, y'_2, z')$  such that  $sk \neq sk'$ .
- The challenger generates two public keys  $pk, pk_0$  related to the secret key  $sk$  and gives  $pk$  to the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- The challenger generates a public key  $pk_1$  related to secret key  $sk'$ .
- The challenger chooses a random bit  $t \in \{0, 1\}$  and gives  $pk_t$  to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- $\mathcal{A}$  tries to find  $t$  and outputs a bit  $t'$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  wins this game if  $t' = t$ .

We set  $PubK_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}(\lambda) = 1$  if  $\mathcal{A}$  wins this game. Let  $\varepsilon$  be the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$  for the above game, then we have

$$\varepsilon = Pr(PubK_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}(\lambda) = 1) - \frac{1}{2}$$

In the game  $PubK_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}(\lambda)$ , the challenger has to choose  $sk \neq sk'$ . We set  $E_i = \{(sk, sk') | sk_i \neq sk'_i\}$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq 5$  where  $sk_i$  and  $sk'_i$  are the  $i$ th component of  $sk$  and  $sk'$ , respectively. Then a selected pair  $(sk, sk')$  in the above game will be at least in one of  $E_i$ s. Assume that  $\mathcal{A}$  is an adversary who can win the game  $PubK_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}$  with a non-negligible advantage  $\varepsilon$ . Then at least for one of  $E_i$ s,  $\mathcal{A}$  has an advantage more than  $\frac{\varepsilon}{5}$ . We now show how  $\mathcal{A}$  can be used to construct a probabilistic polynomial time distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  for the *DDH* problem.  $\square$

Suppose that the distinguisher is given a quadruple  $T = (g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$  as input and its goal is to determine whether  $T$  is a Diffie-Hellman (*DH*) quadruple or not.  $\mathcal{D}$  emulates the game  $PubK_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}(\lambda)$  for  $\mathcal{A}$  in the manner described below, and observes what  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs. In each case, if  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 0 then  $\mathcal{D}$  guesses that  $T$  must be a *DH* quadruple, while if  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 1 then  $\mathcal{D}$  guesses that  $T$  is not a *DH* quadruple. In detail:  
Distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$ : A quadruple  $T = (g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$  is given as input .

- $\mathcal{D}$  runs *SETUP*( $\lambda$ ), chooses  $I \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$  at random and follows the case  $I$ .

**case 1** ( $x_1 \neq x'_1$ ): In this case,  $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $x_2, y_1, y_2, z \in Z_q, g_2 \in G$  at random and gives

$$(g, g_2, g^a g_2^{x_2}, g^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, g^z)$$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk$  (indeed  $\mathcal{D}$  sets  $sk = (a, x_2, y_1, y_2, z)$  without knowing the value of  $a$ ).  $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $r \in Z_q$  at random and gives

$$(g^b, g_2^r, g^c g_2^{rx_2}, g^{by_1} g_2^{ry_2}, g^{bz})$$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk_t$ .

**case 2** ( $x_2 \neq x'_2$ ): In this case,  $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $x_1, y_1, y_2, z \in Z_q, g_2 \in G$  at random and gives

$$(g_2, g, g^{x_1} g^a, g_2^{y_1} g^{y_2}, g_2^z)$$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk$  (indeed  $\mathcal{D}$  sets  $sk = (x_1, a, y_1, y_2, z)$ ).  $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $r \in Z_q$  at random and gives

$$(g_2^r, g^b, g_2^{rx_1} g^c, g_2^{ry_1} g^{by_2}, g_2^{bz})$$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk_t$ .

**case 3** ( $y_1 \neq y'_1$ ): In this case,  $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $x_1, x_2, y_2, z \in Z_q, g_2 \in G$  at random and gives

$$(g, g_2, g^{x_1} g^{x_2}, g^a g_2^{y_2}, g^z)$$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk$  (indeed  $\mathcal{D}$  sets  $sk = (x_1, x_2, a, y_2, z)$ ).  $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $r \in Z_q$  at random and gives

$$(g^b, g_2^r, g^{bx_1} g^{bx_2}, g^c g_2^{ry_2}, g^{bz})$$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk_t$ .

**case 4** ( $y_2 \neq y'_2$ ): In this case,  $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $x_1, x_2, y_1, z \in Z_q, g_2 \in G$  at random and gives

$$(g_2, g, g^{x_1} g^{x_2}, g_2^{y_1} g^a, g_2^z)$$



to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk$  (indeed  $\mathcal{D}$  sets  $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, a, z)$ ).  
 $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $r \in Z_q$  at random and gives

$$(g_2^r, g_2^b, g_2^{rx_1} g_2^{bx_2}, g_2^{ry_1} g_2^c, g_2^{bz})$$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk_t$ .

**case 5** ( $z \neq z'$ ) In this case,  $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2 \in Z_q$ ,  $g_2 \in G$  at random and gives

$$(g, g_2, g^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, g^{y_1} g_2^{y_2}, g^a)$$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk$  (indeed  $\mathcal{D}$  sets  $sk = (x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2, a)$ ).  
 $\mathcal{D}$  chooses  $r \in Z_q$  at random and gives

$$(g^b, g_2^r, g^{bx_1} g_2^{rx_2}, g^{by_1} g_2^{ry_2}, g^c)$$

to  $\mathcal{A}$  as  $pk_t$ .

- $\mathcal{A}$  outputs a bit  $t$ .
- If  $t = 0$ ,  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs "T is a DH quadruple" and if  $t = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs "T is not a DH quadruple".

For a given  $T$ ,  $\mathcal{D}(T) = 1$  if and only if  $\mathcal{D}$  truly guess whether  $T$  is a DH quadruple or not. Since  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs  $T$  is a DH quadruple if and only if  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs 0, then for the case  $i$ , we have

$$\Pr(\mathcal{D} \text{ outputs "T is a DH quadruple"} | I = i) = \Pr(\mathcal{A} \text{ outputs } 0 | E_i),$$

where the probability is conditioned on the event that case  $i$  is selected by  $\mathcal{D}$ . But for each of the above cases we have  $pk$  and  $pk_t$  are related to the same secret key if and only if  $c = ab$  if and only if  $T$  is a DH quadruple. Then

$$\Pr(\mathcal{D}(T) = 1 | I = i) = \Pr(\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}(\lambda) = 1 | E_i).$$

On the other side, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(\mathcal{D}(T) = 1) &= \frac{1}{2} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^5 \Pr(I = i) \Pr(\mathcal{D}(T) = 1 | I = i) - \frac{1}{2} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^5 \Pr(I = i) \Pr(\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}(\lambda) = 1 | E_i) - \frac{1}{2} \\ &= \frac{1}{5} \sum_{i=1}^5 \Pr(\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}(\lambda) = 1 | E_i) - \frac{1}{2} \\ &= \frac{1}{5} \sum_{i=1}^5 \left( \Pr(\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{inc}(\lambda) = 1 | E_i) - \frac{1}{2} \right) \geq \frac{1}{5} \times \frac{\epsilon}{5} \\ &= \frac{\epsilon}{25}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, if  $\epsilon$  is non-negligible (*i.e.*, our proposed scheme does not achieve key-incomparability), the distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  can solve the DDH problem with non-negligible advantage  $\frac{\epsilon}{25}$  which is clearly a contradiction to the DDH assumption in  $G$ .

## 6.2 Key Privacy

Key privacy plays an important role in providing anonymity of public keys. Hence, we have to show that our proposed scheme achieves some key privacy security levels. The aim of this section is to prove that our proposed scheme is  $IK - CCA$  secure. To do so, we note that our proposed scheme is a hybrid scheme based on Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme as a  $KEM$ . Then, we use Lemma 1 and the following theorem which has been proved by Bellare et al. in [17] to establish our claim.

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $G$  be a group with a subgroup  $\widehat{G}$  of prime order  $q$  and let CS be the associated Cramer-Shoup scheme. If the DDH problem is hard in  $\widehat{G}$ , then CS is anonymous in the sense of  $IK - CCA$ . (theorem 3.2 [17])*

Therefore, the next theorem follows directly from Lemma 1 and Theorem 2.

**Theorem 3.** *If the DDH problem is hard in  $G$ , then the proposed scheme is  $IK - CCA$ -secure in the sense of key privacy.*

## 6.3 Data Privacy

In our scheme, we have adopted the idea of Waters et al.'s scheme to Cramer-Shoup's encryption scheme. This is achieved through the following lemma of Cramer and Shoup.

**Lemma 3.** *If the DDH assumption holds for  $G$  and the TCR assumption holds for  $H$ , then Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme is CCA2 secure. (Theorem 2 [19])*

We used Cramer and Shoup's  $PKE$  as the  $KEM$  of our  $HPKE$  and a family of semantically secure  $SKE$  then the following theorem results from the Lemmas 3, 2.

**Theorem 4.** *Our proposed scheme is CCA2 secure.*

## 7 Comparison

In this section, we compare the proposed scheme with the existing incomparable public key encryption schemes. The comparison is done in terms of security properties as well as their efficiency in the decryption phase. As for key privacy, both Waters et al. and Lee and Lim's schemes are  $IK - CPA$ -secure, however, the proposed scheme performs better in this respect and is  $IK - CCA$ -secure. The proposed scheme outperforms Waters et al. and Lee and Lim's schemes in data privacy and achieves CCA2 security. The proposed scheme performs efficient decryption the same as that of Lee and Lim. The results are summarized in Table 2.



**Table 2.** Comparison of the existing incomparable public key encryption schemes.

Scheme	Incomparability	Efficient Decryption	Key privacy	Data Privacy
Waters et al. [15]	Yes	No	$IK - CPA$	$CCA1$
Lee and Lim[11]	Yes	Yes	$IK - CPA$	$CCA1$
Our Scheme	Yes	Yes	$IK - CCA$	$CCA2$

## 8 Conclusion

Existing incomparable public key cryptosystems proposed by Waters et al. and Lee and Lim are based on the ElGamal encryption scheme. Both of these schemes have  $IK - CPA$  (indistinguishability of keys under chosen plaintext attacks) in key privacy. On the other hand, The homomorphic property of the ElGamal implies that these schemes can not achieve security level better than  $CCA1$ . In this paper, we employ the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme to propose an incomparable public key encryption scheme which achieves  $CCA2$  security in data privacy and has  $IK - CCA$  (indistinguishability of keys under adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks) in key privacy.

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